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A system that is secure but not usable.
A system that is usable but not secure:
Given the choice, which would you use...
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The need to align end-user security and usability is
recognized as a priority for both computing and the nation.
• CRA 2003 “Grand Challenge”
• PITAC 2005 “priority”
• Special publications
[IEEE S&P 2004] [O’Reilly 2005]
• CHI 2005; SOUPS 2005
SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2004
VOLUME 2, NUMBER 5
HONEYPOT FORENSICS • NEW: BASIC TRAINING • THE SHELLCODE GENERATION
®
www.computer.org
The traditional antagonism between usability and security
can no longer be tolerated.
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   Bank =  b3aYZ
 Amazon  = aa66x!
Phonebill = p$2$ta1
2003 — Computing Research Association
 Identifies HCI-SEC as a "Grand Challenge."
2005 — President's Information Technology Advisory Committee
 "Software usability itself is a legitimate and important research topic in cyber security."
2005 — Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security founded
Aligning security and usability is a recognized priority.
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30 years ago, Saltzer & Schroeder identified key 
requirements for building secure systems.




5. Separation of privilege.
6. Least privilege.
7. Least common mechanism.
8. Psychological acceptability.
"The Protection of Information in Computer Systems,"
Saltzer & Schroeder, 1975
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Two of these principles involve usability.
Fail-safe defaults 
 “Base access decisions on permission rather than exclusion.” 
 Make the system secure by default.
 [Implies control of user-initiated configuration changes.]
Psychological acceptability
 “It is essential that the human interface be designed for ease of use, so that users 
routinely and automatically apply the protection mechanisms correctly.”
 If the security system is not easy to use, people will circumvent it.
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Why is HCI-SEC hard?
User interfaces are hard to design.
Security is hard to understand.
There just aren't that many people with both skills.








The more money spent on usability, the less available for security
Total cost = [Security Costs] + [Usability Costs] 
! ! ! + [Documentation Costs] + [Marketing Costs]
! ! ! + [Functionality Costs]











Increased money spent on usability can increase overall security

















HCI-SEC: Usability in the face of an adversary
The adversary can exploit usability features.
The adversary can exploit usability problems.
The adversary can masquerade as tech support.
Security features make systems harder to use—so 
people disable them.
Adversaries adapt faster than legitimate users.
People can't distinguish attacks from system errors.
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Security professionals traditionally blamed users
(and administrators!)
Users are expected to:
 Use passwords that were too difficult to guess, but 
could be remembered without writing them down.
Administrators are expected to:
 Maintain system & apply patches
Developers are expected to:
 Securely code.
 Understand crypto.
Like blaming plane crashes on "pilot error."
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COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ACM December 1999/Vol. 42, No. 12 41
Confidentiality is an important aspect of computer security. It
depends on authentication mechanisms, such as passwords, to safeguard access to infor-
mation [9]. Traditionally, authentication procedures are divided into two stages: identifi-
cation (User ID), to identify the user; and authentication, to verify that the user is the
legitimate owner of the ID. It is the latter stage that requires a secret password. To date,
research on password security has focused on designing technical mechanisms to protect 
Why users compromise computer security mechanisms and 









access to systems; the usability of these mecha-
nisms has rarely been investigated. Hitchings [8]
and Davis and Price [4] argue that this narrow per-
spective has produced security mechanisms that
are, in practice, less effective than they are generally
assumed to be. Since security mechanisms are
designed, implemented,
applied and breached by
people, human factors
should be considered in
their design. It seems that
currently, hackers pay more attention to the
human link in the security chain than security
designers do, for example, by using social engi-
neering techniques to obtain passwords. 
The key element in password security is the
crackability of a password combination. Davies
and Ganesan [3] argue that an adversary’s ability
to crack passwords is greater than usually believed.
System-generated passwords are essentially the
optimal security approach; however, user-gener-
ated passwords are potentially more memorable
and thus less likely to be disclosed (because users
do not have to write them down). The U.S. Fed-
eral Information Processing Standards [5] suggest
several criteria for assuring different levels of pass-
word security. Password composition, for example,
relates the size of a character set from which a
password has been chosen to its level of security.
An alphanumeric
password is therefore
more secure than one
composed of letters
alone. Short password
lifetime—changing passwords frequently—is sug-
gested as reducing the risk associated with unde-
tected compromised passwords. Finally, password
ownership, in particular individual ownership, is
recommended to:
• Increase individual accountability;
• Reduce illicit usage;
• Allow for an establishment of system usage
audit trails; and 
• Reduce frequent password changes due to
group membership fluctuations. 
!A n n e  A d a m s  a n d  




A. Adams & M. A. Sasse (1999): Users Are Not The Enemy: Why users compromise 
security mechanisms and how to take remedial measures,  in: Communications 
of the ACM, 42 (12), pp. 40-46 December 1999
Many security systems fail invisibly. 
Which of these is encrypted?
U2FsdGVkX1/XlRf6Gt1czLSd9VgyKQatH76f4VFoF5w=
VGhpcyBpcyBhIHRlc3QK==
Which of these actually erases data?
format c:      (Windows 95)
format c:      (Windows XP)
format c:      (Vista)
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The lack of transparency makes it hard to understand 
online privacy & security.
Hidden Information at the Server:
 Log files
 Third-party Image Servers 
 Web Bugs




DNS is opaque to most users:
 Many DNS names can map to one IP address
 Many IP addresses can map to one DNS name
 No relationship between a DNS name and a company
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File-sharing programs and social networking websites 
encourage reckless sharing. 
"A study of Kazaa P2P file Sharing," Good & Krekelberg, 2003
 Lab study of users.
 Searched Kazaa for potentially confidential files.
 Made "Credit Cards.xls" file available; people tried to download it!
Facebook Applications (2009):
 Access all of your data
 Access your friend's data
 "Surveys" are applications.
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Users can't distinguish errors from attacks.
"The Emperor's New Security Indicators," 
Schechter, Dhamija, Ozment and Fischer, 2007
Study of Site Key.
 Study of 67 users under varying conditions.
 "https" removed
 site-authentication images remove ("site key not available at this time")
 SSL warning pages
23 of 25 participants (92%) provided 
username & password when 
Site Key authentication image was missing.
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bank’s servers and forge pages that are supposed to be au-
thenticated via HTTPS. To detect such attacks, users must
verify the presence of indicators that show HTTPS is active.
In IE6, users can either look for the https in the address bar
or for a lock icon at the bottom right of the browser frame.
4.2. Removing site-authentication images
Banks and other websites have introduced site-
authentication images to help users distinguish a bank’s
real website from impostor sites. These sites repeatedly
instruct their customers to verify their site-authentication
images before entering their passwords. The absence of a
site-authentication image is a clue that might reveal a man-
in-the-middle attack against the bank’s web address. Alter-
natively, this clue might also alert participants that the page
has been loaded from the address of a ‘phishing’ web site.
We wanted to measure how many participants would disre-
gard the absence of their site-authentication images.
In this task, we continued to disable HTTPS. We used
our HTTP proxy to rewrite the bank’s password-entry
page—removing the site-authentication image (and any ac-
companying text phrase) and replacing it with an upgrade
message.
In the study, we used the real brand name of the bank’s
site-authentication image feature in the message. For this
paper, we’ve replaced that brand name with the acronym
“SAI”.
SAI Maintanance [sic] Notice:
[bank name] is currently upgrading our award
winning SAI feature. Please contact customer
service if your SAI does not reappear within the
next 24 hours.
4.3. Presenting a warning page
The final attack clue was hard not to notice: we replaced
the password-entry page with a warning page copied from
Internet Explorer 7 Beta 3.4 We wanted to see if participants
would disregard such a conspicuous warning message.
This warning page, illustrated in Figure 1, strongly dis-
courages participants from continuing to the website. It of-
fers two options: to close the website (recommended) and
the option to continue (not recommended). The warning
4This page is the same as that in the final release of Internet Explorer
7. We modified the IE7 warning page so that images and scripts would
be loaded from a fictional address that could be intercepted and served by
our proxy: http://browser.security/. Therefore, we were able
to simulate a warning page in Internet Explorer 6 that looked identical to
that of Internet Explorer 7. There was one difference: when a user clicked
to close the page, they would see a dialog from Internet Explorer 6 asking
them to confirm that they wanted the window closed.
Figure 1. An image of the warning page sent
in place of the password-entry page. The
black rectangle in the address bar was not
present in the study; we have added it here
to hide the identity of the bank.
explains that “Security certificate problems may indicate an
attempt to fool you or intercept any data you send to the
server.”
5. Results
5.1. How we report results
In this study, we collected password-entry data from two
sources: data observed by our proxy and data self-reported
by participants.
Our proxy recorded a binary outcome for each task: ei-
ther the participant disregarded attack clues and entered
their password, or they withheld their password and did not
login. Our proxy reported that a participant entered his or
her password only if it observed the participant submit a
form field named ‘passcode’ to the password-entry page.
We used data self-reported by participants to corroborate
our observed response.5
Of course, experimental realities prevent us from perfect
observation: we identified participants whose self-reported
responses cannot be corroborated with our observed re-
sponses. A discrepancy may occur because the participant
did not enter the bank’s correct web address, because the
experiment facilitator made an error in engaging the proxy,
5In addition to responses reported on the task sheet, we used a post-task
questionnaire to ask participants if they entered their passcode for each task




6 Updates available from:
http://usablesecurity.org/emperor/
Users do not want to manage their security...
Users have real-world tasks
 Read email
 Prepare documents
 Get home and see the kids…
Managing security is a secondary task & somebody else's problem
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The "Barn Door" property.
Once a secret is out, it's out.
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http://www.crh.noaa.gov/Image/abr/06172007/pole_barn_west_door_damage.jpg




There are three primary HCI-SEC approaches.
#1 — Make it "just work"
 Invisible security
 Fix the bugs!
#2 — Make security understandable
 Reduce configurability
 Visible security states
 Intuitive user interfaces
 Metaphors that users can understand
#3 — Train the user 
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Approach #1: Make it work
Example: Discarded Drives
 Between 1998 and 2007 I bought 1400 used drives.
 Most were "formatted"…
 … but most had recoverable information.
Solution: fix the "format" command
 In Windows 2003, format hides data.











Approach #3: Train the user to act securely...
Give the user a consistent user experience.
 SSL certificates up-to-date
 Digitally signed mail
Give the user training consistent with their user experience.
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NPS is actively researching HCI-SEC
Some Current Projects:
 Increased use of SSL; more attention to certificate validity.
 Signing of "Bulk Email"
 Biometric authentication and identity management.
Remember:
 "Those who would give up Essential Usability to purchase 
a little Temporary Security, deserve neither Usability nor 
Security."
— Benjamin Franklin
(sort of)
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